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Abstract
This paper analyze the demand for educational services in a context in which households
and schools are heterogeneous. Distance from student’s place of residence to schools is a key
component of our model. School quality and household characteristics are also important in-
gredients.
Our empirical analysis uses rich and novel information from a large sample of students in
Chile. We combine geo-referenced data with longitudinal information on student’s performance.
Our longitudinal data contains information for 95% of the Chilean students initially enrolled in
8th grade in 2004. For each student in our data, we observe her scores in two national tests
(taken during eight and tenth grades, respectively), all her grades during high school, and her
performance on the Chilean standardized test of college admission. We also observe her place
of residence and the locations of the schools in which her enrolled.
Our results shed lights on the determinants of schooling choices. Our ultimate objective is
to understand the impact of these choices on academic performance and and long-term outcomes.
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1 Introduction
The extensive literature analyzing the Chilean educational system suggests that most children have
limited access to high-quality schools. This conclusion is consistent with the increasing conflicts
generated by students and teachers, that has produced a sequence of protests, strickes, and new
law projects, some of them aimed at reforming the roots of the existing educational voucher system
and in particular, to increase the role of public schools.
Not only a poor average education level is part of the diagnosis, but also an important gap.
Comparing students’ performances on standardized test scores suggests that students attending
private schools have significantly higher scores than those enrolled in either voucher or public
schools. Similarly, using appropriate (but not all possible) control variables, leads the conclusion
that students enrolled in voucher schools out-perform students from public schools. The gap in
results has been associated with a number of reasons, including lack of information on school
quality, and hence, on competition. In particular, a number of analysts suggest that in the root
of the poor quality observed, is the lack of competition among schools which in turn, is explained
because poor families do not have or use quality information. This idea use to be supported by
anecdotal information, and “declared preferences surveys,” indicating that families do not know
the results of standarized test and that a main aspect to decide the school for their children is
distance.
The literature and evidence on how families decide the school for their children is scarce. In no
country as in Chile this question is so relevant, due to the extension of the voucher system, which
unlike elsewhere, it followed much more closely Friedman’s (1955) idea. For Chile, Gomez, Chu-
macero and Paredes (2009) analyze family decisions using distance, among the relevant variables.
The decision model, however, is focused on the nearest school, thus limiting the number of choices.
In this paper we also have the same motivation, that is, to find out the incentives leading
families to choose school for their children. We expand the previous model to a more complete
choice than “the nearest school available”. In particular, the purpose of this paper is to analyze how
families choose the school for their children under the hypothesis that they have a very imperfect
knowledge of the school quality. In particular, we explore how consistent is the data with the
popular knowledge that a number of selective and distinctive schools are much better that the rest.
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To derive the model, we follow an empirical oriented literature aimed at estimating revealed
substitution of characteristics, as in Tay (2003), Luft et al. (1990); Mc Fadden (1978) and White
and Morrisey (1998). The relevance of substitution, where distance is a positive characteristic of
the service, can directly be associated with the nature of competition, the relevance of geographic
monopolies, and hence, naturally has been a concern in antitrust regulators (see, for instance,
Elzinga and Hogarty, 1973 and 1978). To estimate the model, we construct a data set with the
distance between homes and each school in the Greater Santiago Area.
The effect of competition on academic performance is one key but relative left aside aspect to
explain the evolution of performance. Hoxby (1994 and 2002), and Ladd and Fiske (2001) study the
relationship between competition and schools’ academic results using data from a voucher “exper-
iment” in Milwaukee, USA and New Zealand, respectively. The firs study finds that competition
has a positive effect on the average results. The opposite is found in New Zealand. Maranto,
Milliman and Stevens (2000) find that in Florida, the role of competition is reduced because low
family income does not allow students to move to a private school. Bayer and McMillan (2005) find
a significant positive relationship between competition and scores with data from an urban area in
the USA. Braun-Munzinger (2005) reviews most of the evidence found so far.
The Chilean experience stands out because the reform that established the voucher system
was country-wide and almost tree decades have passed since it was implemented, while in other
countries, in general, small experiments have taken place in cities or small groups of schools.
The main references to this literature are Gallego (2002), Hsieh and Urquiola (2003), Auguste
and Valenzuela (2004). These papers use data for the whole country, using each county as an
observation. Hsieh and Urquiola (2003) study the effect of the voucher system on schools’ results.
They construct a panel with data from 150 counties between 1982 and 1996, and measure the
difference in schools’ results before and after the 1981 reform. They compare the changes among
rural and urban schools assuming that competition, measured by the entrance of the new voucher-
funded private schools, was less intense in rural than in urban areas. They conclude that the
voucher system has not improved school performance and that, in turn, it has produced sorting of
the students. That is, the students of higher ability, higher family income, or who are set apart in
some other dimension, have transferred from public schools to voucher-funded private schools.
Hsieh and Urquiola (2003) argue that the lack of effect of competition on schools performance
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may be due to the way in which parents choose schools. They claim that parents may choose
schools with good students, which would induce schools to improve their results only by attracting
good students and not by raising the quality of the education offered. This in turn would reduce
the scores of the schools that lose good students and the net effect would be zero.
Gallego (2002) tests the existence of a positive relationship between competition and school
performance, and if this relationship is more important for private voucher schools than for public
schools. Using cross-section regressions to explain SIMCE scores with a county-level competition
index measured as the proportion of students in each county that attend private schools, and other
socioeconomic variables, he finds support for both hypotheses.
Gallego (2002) states that competition is endogenous to test scores, and faces the endogeneity
problem using total school enrollment per county as an instrument for the degree of competition. He
also uses the degree of urbanicity in the schools’ location as another possible instrument. He finds
that without using instrumental variables he obtains a negative and significant effect of competition
on schools’ performance, which shows the importance of addressing endogeneity.
Auguste and Valenzuela (2004) study the impact of competition on schools’ academic perfor-
mance following Gallego (2002)’s methodology. They also find a positive effect of competition on
schools’ results and conclude that competition increases the sorting of students between public and
private schools based on students’ family income.
More recently, Benguria and Paredes (2008) use multilevel data, with observations for each
student in Santiago, and taking into account the interaction between student level and school level
data. The distance from each school to the closest similar one is taken as a measure of competition.
They find a positive, though not robust relationship between competition and test scores is found.
Gallego and Hernando (2009) estimate a random utility model and find out that parents take
into account schools’ average scores, accesibility (in terms of closeness to home) and the fees charged
by schools. Also, they find that parents with higher expectations about their pupil’s skills place a
greater value on the schools’ test scores.
With evidence from the USA, Hastings, Kane and Staiger (2005) find out that parents value
proximity and schools’ average test scores, and that the importance given by parents to scores is
increasing in family income and in student skills. Hastings and Weinstein (2007) conclude that
information is a relevant variable when parents choose schools. In the context of the No-Child-
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Left-Behind Act, they find that 16% of the students moved to a different school when their parents
where informed about their under-performance.
The paper has 5 sections including this introduction. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3
develops a model of school choice and discusses its empirical implementation. Section 4 presents
the main results. Section 5 concludes.
2 A New Data Set
The present research is done with a new data set, combining four different sources of information
to construct a unique longitudinal data set of Chilean Students. We will use information from
a national standardized test, the SIMCE. We will also use the College Selection Test (PSU in
spanish), an optional test that is taken ant the end of the senior year of high school. We will merge
this information with the official information of the Chilean Ministry of Education and with the
geographic positions of the students and High Schools. We merge the information using the R.U.N.
(similar to the social security numbers) of all students.
The SIMCE test is a national mandatory test, that evaluates all students in different grades.
During the year 2004, 8th graders took the test and their parents answered a very complete ques-
tionnaire. From these answerers we will obtain a measure of the students ability and socioeconomic
status. This test evaluates all of the Chilean students at that time. The test is developed by the
Ministry of Education of Chile. In 2006, the same students were evaluated in 10th grade with the
SIMCE test. Therefore, we can track the student’s performance during the years.
The second data set is the Registry of Students From Chile (RECH), that has got the high
School grades off all the students graduating from High School in 2008. This information is from
the Ministry of Education of Chile.
The third data set is the College Selection Test from 2009 (PSU in spanish), a voluntary test,
that is a requisition for entering most of the Universities and for obtaining most of the scholarships.
This test is taken by roughly 83% of students that finish high school, therefore, we do not have
information for all the students that graduated from High School. This test is administered,
published and developed by the Department of Evaluation, Measurement and Education Registry
of the University of Chile. This data set contains information provided by the student regarding
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socioeconomic characteristics.
The fourth source of information contains the addresses associated with the place of residences of
the individuals in the PSU 2009 data file. Using GIS technology,1 we obtain geographic coordinates
for a large sub-sample of those addresses. We combine this information with the geographical
location of schools to compute distance between students’ residences and schools. To our knowledge,
this is the first paper computing distances at this level in Chile.
With respect to our sample size, the total number of individuals with valid information in PSU
2009 is 278,275. The sample reduces to 110,811 after restricting it to individuals with address in
Greater Santiago. Out of those, 29,188 are males with valid information in SIMCE 2006 (when they
were attending tenth grade). For 21,866 of them we are able to geographically locate their place
of residence (as reported in PSU 2009). Finally, after restricting the sample to those observations
in Greater Santiago (20,650),2 those with valid information from the parents’ SIMCE 2006 survey
(15,955) and to those enrolled in the same school in 2006 and 2008 we obtain 10,007 observations.3
Table 1 presents the description of the variables utilized in this study as well as the associated
sources of information. Table 2 presents the summary statistics from our sample of schools. We
present the information by school category (Big ten/Other). Table 3 on the other hand, presents
the summary statistics from our sample of students. As for schools, the information is presented
by school category.
Figures 1 and 2 present a graphical analysis of the intuition behind our empirical approach.
3 Our Approach
Consider the following regression model for individual’s i test score attending school j Tij
Tij = α0 + α1Vj + α2Xi + α3Zj + eij
where Dj is equal to 1 if school j is voucher and 0 otherwise, Xi is a vector of student-specific
controls, and Zj is a vector of school-specific controls. This regression model has motived the
1The geographic positioning was dome by the firm Infomatic .
2We exclude the cities of Buin, Colina, Curavavi, Isla de Maipo, Lampa, Melipilla, Padre Hurtado, Paine, Pen˜aflor,
Pirque, Talagante, Til-Til and Calera de Tango. These are considered Santiago’s suburbs.
319 observations are lost in the regression, finalizing with 9,988 students
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empirical studies studying the chilean educational system. The empirical literature has focused on
the sign and magnitude of α1 which has been interpreted as the effect of vouchers or competition.
Our approach is different. We model the process used by parents when deciding where to enroll
their children. In this context, we consider the standard approach too simplistic. In that literature
the endogenous selection process of schools is kept silent. In this paper we deal with it.
In this paper we extends the literature by modeling the complex decision process of choosing a
school. We point out that whether or not a student is observed attending a particular school is a
result of a complex process involving family characteristics, characteristics of the school attended
and of those alternative schools considered during the decision process.4
Let Ωi denote the set of schools considered by household when deciding where to enroll child i.
We assume families decide first between school categories. Specifically, we assume the existence of
two different groups of schools. Schools known by their reputation for being high-quality (famous)
and schools that are nearby the household. Thus, we assume Ωi =
{
Ωqi ∪ Ωdi
}
where Ωqi and Ω
d
i
represent the set of “famous” and nearby schools, respectively. The dimensionality of each of the
set of schools is arbitrary but exogenous and finite.
Let Uij(k) be utility in the event of attending school j of category k (with k = {q, d}). We
assume
Uij(k) = α+ βkXi + γZij(k) + ij(k)
where Xi is a vector of student-specific controls (e.g., mother’s or father’s education), Zij(k) is a
vector of school- and student-specific controls (distance from student i’s place of residence to school
j in category k), and ijk is an error term. We model the schooling decision using a discrete choice
approach. Specifically, if we denote by Dij(k) a dummy variable indicating whether or not student
i attends school j of category k, we assume:
Dij(k) = 1 if and only if Uij(k) = max
l(r)∈{Ωqi∪Ωdi }
{Uil(r)} with r = {q, d}
Formally, we allow for individual- and alternative-specific regressors when modeling the decision
model.
4In other words, we specify the information set of the households when deciding where to enroll their children.
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3.1 Empirical Counterpart and Implementation
The structure of our decision model is similar to the one utilized in a nested logit regression with
two levels. The upper level defines the school category whereas the lower level defines the set of
schools within each category. This model allows for within category correlation of the ijks.
We estimate the model using our sample of students from SIMCE 2006 and PSU 2009. Given
the characteristics of this sample, we focus on the decision of selection a high school.
We utilize a list of ten high schools of high reputation to define Ωq. These schools are: Liceo
Salesiano, Liceo Lastarria, Liceo Dario Salas, Liceo Barros Borgon˜o, Liceo de Aplicacion, Liceo
Amunategui, Liceo Barros Arana, Colegio Don Bosco, Instituto Nacional Jose Miguel Carrera and
Colegio San Ignacio. We denote this group as the Big Ten Schools. For each household on the
other hand, Ωd is defined as the 150 closest schools.5
4 Results
We estimate the household’s preferences for each of the schools in our sample.
Table 4 presents the controls (variables) utilized in estimation. It also indicates the decision
level in which each variable is considered.
Table 5 presents the results from the nested logit model. For the upper level model (enrolled
in one of the Big Ten schools) we observe that the number of books in the household, father’s and
mothers education and family income have all increase the likelihood of choosing an elite voucher
school. On the other hand, absent father, number of family members and local competition have
negative effects. It is particularly interesting that if a student lives in an area surrounded by a
large fraction of voucher schools, the probability of attending to an elite school goes down.
For the lower level model (enrolled in one of the 150 nearest schools), we observe that single sex
and new schools, and high average SIMCE score in mathematics affect are positive attributes (in-
creasing the demand for schools). At the same time, distance from place of residence to the school,
voucher schools and annual tuition are negative attributes (reducing the demand for schools).
Our results suggest that students would travel one extra kilometer for seven more points of both
5It is worth mentioning that with our definition of Ωq and Ωd we cover more than 92% of the students in the
data. That is, less than eight percent of the sample does not attend one of the Big Ten Schools or a school among
the 150 closest schools.
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SIMCE scores. Alternatively, our results indicate that that students would be indifferent between
traveling one extra kilometer and paying 100.000 pesos more per year in school tuition.
5 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the demand for educational services in a context in which households and
schools are heterogeneous. Our empirical analysis uses rich and novel information from a large
sample of students in Chile. We combine geo-referenced data with longitudinal information on
student’s performance. To our knowledge this is the first study combining student-specific data on
academic achievement, distance from place of residence to school, and localOur results shed lights
on the determinants of schooling choices.
We found that parent’s education, a high number of books in the house, and income increase the
probability of attending one of the elite (or Big Ten school) in Gran Santiago. When analyzing the
demand for the nearest 150 schools (excluding the elite schools), we obtain that students/families
value more schools with higher SIMCE scores, of a single gender, located close to the place of
residence, and with lower tuition.
Our preliminary results show that students would travel one extra kilometer for seven additional
points in the SIMCE test scores. We also estimate that the one extra kilometer of distance between
the place of residence and schools is valued in 100,000 pesos per year. availability of schools.
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Figure 1: Geographical Location of Secondary Schools in 2006
Greater Santiagoa
(A) All Schools
(B) Big Ten Schoolsb (C) Other Schools
by Type (Voucher or Public)c by Type (Voucher or Public)c
Note: Authors’ calculation using information from PSU2009 and SIMCE2006. Each panel depicts the geographical
location of secondary schools in 2006. Panel A presents all the schools in our data. Panels B and C use the sample of
schools utilized in this study which excludes private schools. (a): We exclude the cities of Buin, Colina, Curavavi, Isla
de Maipo, Lampa, Melipilla, Padre Hurtado, Paine, Pen˜aflor, Pirque, Talagante, Til-Til and Calera de Tango. These
are considered Santiago’s suburbs. (b) The Big Ten Schools are: Liceo Salesiano, Liceo Lastarria, Liceo Dario Salas,
Liceo Barros Borgon˜o, Liceo de Aplicacion, Liceo Amunategui, Liceo Barros Arana, Colegio Don Bosco, Instituto
Nacional Jose Miguel Carrera and Colegio San Ignacio. (c) A red circle indicates a voucher secondary school (private
subsidized) whereas a green triangle identifies a public school.
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Figure 2: Geographical Location of Students Attending 10th Grade in 2006
Greater Santiagoa
(A) All Students (All Schools)
(B) Sample of Students Attending Any of The (C) Sample of Students Attending Any of
Big Ten Schoolb the 150 Closest Schools
by Type (Voucher or Public)c by Type (Voucher or Public)c
Note: Authors’ calculation using information from PSU2009 and SIMCE2006. Each panel depicts the geographical
location of home addresses (as reported in PSU2009) of students attending 10th grade in 2006. Panel A presents
all the students in our data. Panels B and C use the sample of students utilized in this study which excludes those
attending private schools. (a): We exclude the cities of Buin, Colina, Curavavi, Isla de Maipo, Lampa, Melipilla,
Padre Hurtado, Paine, Pen˜aflor, Pirque, Talagante, Til-Til and Calera de Tango. These are considered Santiago’s
suburbs. (b) The Big Ten Schools are: Liceo Salesiano, Liceo Lastarria, Liceo Dario Salas, Liceo Barros Borgon˜o,
Liceo de Aplicacion, Liceo Amunategui, Liceo Barros Arana, Colegio Don Bosco, Instituto Nacional Jose Miguel
Carrera and Colegio San Ignacio. (c) A red circle indicates a student attending a voucher secondary school (private
subsidized) whereas a green triangle identifies the place of residence of a student attending a public school.
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Table 1: List of Variables, Sources of Information and Description of Variables
Variable Sources Description
Student-Specific Variables
Number of Books SIMCE 2006 Dummy: 1 if in the household are more than
100 books, 0 otherwise
Father’s Education SIMCE 2006 Father’s years of Education
Mother’s Education SIMCE 2006 Mother’s years of Education
No Father SIMCE 2006 Dummy: 1 if the student does not have father,
0 otherwise
Family Income SIMCE 2006 Monthly Family Income in 2006
Number of Family Members SIMCE 2006 Number of Family Members living in the Household
Competition SIMCE 2006 and Fraction of Voucher schools in the neighborhood
PSU 2009 (radium of 7.5 Kilometers)
School-Specific Variables
Simce 2003 SIMCE 2003 Average Simce Score in 2003 (including math
and language scores)
New School SIMCE 2003 and Dummy: 1 if school is new (school founded
PSU 2009 between 2003 and 2006), 0 otherwise
Annual Tuition MINEDUC School’s per-student Annual Tuition in 2004
Single Gender SIMCE 2006 Dummy: 1 if School is Single Gender School (only boys),
0 otherwise
Voucher School SIMCE 2006 Dummy: 1 if school is voucher, and 0 otherwise (public)
Big Ten School SIMCE 2006 Dummy: 1 if school belongs to the big ten schools,
0 otherwise
School and Student-Specific Variables
Distance SIMCE 2006 and Distance (kms) between student’ place of residence
PSU 2009 and any secondary school
Ranking SIMCE 2006 and Ranking based on Distance between student’ place of residence
PSU 2009 and alternative schools. Ranking indicates the position
of the chosen school within school category.
Note: Most of the information from SIMCE 2006 comes from the questionnaires for parents. The Big Ten Schools are:
Liceo Salesiano, Liceo Lastarria, Liceo Dario Salas, Liceo Barros Borgon˜o, Liceo de Aplicacio´n, Liceo Amunategui,
Liceo Barros Arana, Colegio Don Bosco, Instituto Nacional Jose´ Miguel Carrera and Colegio San Ignacio.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Sample of Schools
Variable School Category
Big Ten Schools Others
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Single Gender .8 .421 0 1 .045 .208 0 1
Simce 2003: Mathematics 312.3 37.0 238 370 239.7 50.4 219 338
Simce 2003: Language 296.6 21.2 257 326 248.5 44.8 223 313
New School 0 0 0 0 .0193 .139 0 1
Voucher .3 .483 0 1 .807 .394 0 1
Annual Tuition (1,000 of 2004 pesos) 82.8 166.3 0 488.0 122.6 139.3 0 618
Number of Schools 10 504
Note: The Big Ten Schools are: Liceo Salesiono, Liceo Lastarria, Liceo Dario Salas, Liceo Barros Borgon˜o, Liceo de Aplicacion, Liceo Amunategui, Liceo Barros
Arana, Colegio Don Bosco, Instituto Nacional Jose Miguel Carrera and Colegio San Ignacio.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Sample of Students
Variable School Category
Big Ten Schools Others
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Single Gender .923 .265 0 1 .094 .291 0 1
Simce 2003: Mathematics 329.45 33.34 238 370 251.68 43.41 219 338
Simce 2003: Language 303.96 18.64 257 326 256.7 35.51 223 313
New School 0 0 0 0 .013 .115 0 1
Voucher .105 .307 0 1 .808 .393 0 1
Number of Books .261 .439 0 1 .131 .337 0 1
Father’s Education 12.82 3.04 0 17 11.23 3.53 0 17
Mother’s Education 12.72 2.55 0 17 11.25 3.038 0 17
No Father .013 .114 0 1 .027 .163 0 1
Family Income 541.79 366.19 9.49 1800 380.39 312.61 2.45 1800
Number of Family Members 4.656 1.34 2 11 4.83 1.58 2 11
Competition .795 .053 .55 1 .811 .061 .52 1
Distance 8.59 4.74 .140 40.00 2.69 2.38 .0002 32.39
Ranking based 4.61 2.96 1 10 25.11 32.40 1 150
based on Distance
Number of Students 1,504 8,503
Note: The Big Ten Schools are: Liceo Salesiono, Liceo Lastarria, Liceo Dario Salas, Liceo Barros Borgon˜o, Liceo de Aplicacion, Liceo Amunategui, Liceo Barros
Arana, Colegio Don Bosco, Instituto Nacional Jose Miguel Carrera and Colegio San Ignacio.
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Table 4: Variables by Decision Level
Variable Upper Level Lower Level
Selection of School Category Selection of School
Number of Books Y N
Father’s Education Y N
Mother’s Education Y N
No Father Y N
Family Income Y N
Number of Family Members Y N
Competition Y N
Simce 2003 N Y
New School N Y
Annual Tuition N Y
Single Gender N Y
Voucher School N Y
Distance N Y
Note: The Big Ten Schools are: Liceo Salesiano, Liceo Lastarria, Liceo Dario Salas, Liceo Barros Borgon˜o, Liceo de
Aplicacio´n, Liceo Amunategui, Liceo Barros Arana, Colegio Don Bosco, Instituto Nacional Jose´ Miguel Carrera and
Colegio San Ignacio.
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Table 5: Results from Nested Logit Regression
Variable Coefficient
Lower Level (School-Specific): Selecting School
Single Gender .132
(.0130)
Simce 2003: Language -.014
(0.002)
Simce 2003: Mathematics 0.028
(0.002)
New School .144
(.034)
Distance -.099
(.008)
Voucher -.062
(.007)
Annual Tuition -.0001
(.00002)
Upper Level (Student-Specific): Selecting School Categorya
Number of Books .528
(.073)
Father’s Education .061
(.014)
Mother’s Education .071
(.013)
No Father -.023
(.291)
Number of Family Members -.144
(.020)
Family Income .0003
(.0001)
Competition -3.083
(.2689)
Number of Observations 1,598,080
Number of Cases (Students) 9,988
Note: The associated estimated τ are 0.174 (0.013) and 0.30 (0.026) for the 150 closest schools and big ten schools,
respectively. The likelihood ratio test for IIA (conditional logit) indicate the rejection of the IIA hypothesis. The p-
value is 0.0000. The Big Ten Schools are: Liceo Salesiono, Liceo Lastarria, Liceo Dario Salas, Liceo Barros Borgon˜o,
Liceo de Aplicacion, Liceo Amunategui, Liceo Barros Arana, Colegio Don Bosco, Instituto Nacional Jose Miguel
Carrera and Colegio San Ignacio. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. (a) The estimates are obtained using
the set of 150 closest schools as baseline. In this context, a positive (negative) sign would be an indication that the
variable has a positive (negative) effect on the probability of enrolling in a Big Ten School.
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